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I rJ Till: s1_1pn1:nr-: CGIJPT GP THE STATE GF TJTAH
11TAH,

plaintiff-nespondent,
Case No. lqo13
,,'[,t.llnf'

A.

8UNDY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Aprellant, Claude A.
of rape,
anCI

Bundy,

appeals his convictions

for violation of Utah Code Ann."> 76-5-402 (1978),

forcible sodomy,

for violation of Utah Code Ann.

' 76-5-40 3 ( 1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found g ui 1 ty of rape and forcible
soc1rimy in a

jury trial held December 9, in, and 13, 1982 in

thP Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah,

the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding.

On ,Jarillary 20,

1983 appellant was sentenced to serve five

years to life in the Utah State Penitentiary for each count,

s0ntences to run concurrently.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks af firmance of the cnnv icl ionc:
below.

STATEMENT OF THC FACTS
In the spring of 1981 the victim, Sherry
Christiansen, hegan babysitting her two young nieces, Tiffan,
and Kimberly, the children of appellant and Sherry's oldet
sister Lori Bundy (T.

20-22, 25, 34, 170-172).

years old at the time (T. 19).

Sherry was 12

Sherry babysat her nieces on a

regular basis through the end of 1981 ( T.

22, 2fi, 35).

Appellant and his wife both worked.

Appellant, a

construction worker, worked swing shift and generally left for
work at approximately 1:00 p.m., returning home between 11:30
p.m. and midnight (T. 27, 39).

Lori Bundy worked nights at

Zion's Mountain View Nursing Home as a nurses' aid, and she
usually went to work between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. and returned
at approximately 7:30 a.m.

the next day (T. 26,

38-39, 178).

Sherry generally arrived at the Bundys • apartment
around noon to begin babysitting, and could go home after
appellant returned from work, approx imatley twelve hours
later;

however, Sherry regularly stayed overnight at the

Bundys' apartment (T. 2R, 37-38).

Because Lori Rund y worked

all night, when Sherry stayed overnight at the Bundys'
apartment, she was alone with appellant and the two sleepinq
little girls (T. 26, 39).
During this period of 1981 when Sherry bahys3t
nieces, appellant induced her to engage in sexual intercourse

-2-

,.,,1

-,,

,,,

<;nclrJ1ny with him 2S

,,i

lit

trial Sherry described

Th0 first such
, 1 .. ,1

i

1 ,1

I

to 30 times (T. 41, fi4-fi7; R.

t ·

in detail two such incidents.

incident described by Sherry at trial

;,t the end of c1une or the beginning of July, 1981 in

int 's apartrnent at approximately 12:30 a.m. after

app"l Jant

had returned from work (T. 41)1

Appellant

,rndtr·ssr>n

Sherry and had her lie down on his bed

(T.

54-55).

Appellant told her to open her legs, and then he placed his
pe11is

in her vagina ( T.

St;-57).

A few minutes later appellant

placed his tongue in Sherry's vagina, fondled her breasts, and
then again placed his penis in her vagina (T. fi0-61).
The second occasion described by Sherry at trial
took place

in Sherry's home during the Christmas holiday in

1981 (T.fi5).

Appellant took Sherry into her bedroom and had

her pull down her pants and lean over her bed.

Appellant

pulled down his pants, and approaching her from the rear, put
\,is penis

in her vagina (T. fifi).

appellant engaged in sexual

This was the last time

intercourse with Sherry (T. 65,

Fi 7).

At the time of trial,
wpre involved
RK,

16 S-lfifi,

appellant and his wife Lori

in divorce proceedings ini tated by appellant ( T.
179-lRl).

Lori testified at trial pursuant to an

il•Jteement reached by the prosecutor and appellant's trial

This was not the first time appellant had induced Sherry
t" have sex with him.
The first time had been in May or
ly c!une 1981 (T. fi4-6S).

-3-

counsel

in a discussion with th0 cn11t·t

111

,·11 wil1•· i

I

I

1

her testimony ( T. 7 5 , 8 1 ) .
moved fol'." a mistt:"ial, cla iminq that

Lnt i

1·n11l

1

n"t

t,

against appellant despite counsel's cons,·nt !Jecaw;e ,, 1,1,, 1
had not personally consented

1

(T. 74-P2, 159).

the matter undel'." advisement (T. 82, 159-lliO, 16"3).
At the close of the evidence,

the

j11rv foun11

appellant guilty of !'."ape and fot:"cible sodomy (T. 219),
court denied appellant's motion fol'." f'listrial

(T.

..

220-2711.

Appellant then brought this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S WIFE WAS PROPP.RLY PERMITTED TO
TESTIFY.
A.
APPELLAN'T' HAD NO ARSOLUTE PRIVILF:GE
AGAINST HIS WIFE'S TESTIMONY.

Appellant argues that the trial court
permitted his wife, Lori Runny,

to testify aqainst him.

Appellant contenc1s that he had an absolute privileqe against
his wife's testimony under Utah Code Ann.
which states:

78-24-8(1)

(lqs11,

"A husbanc1 cannot be examinec1 fol'." Ol'." against

his wife without her consent, nor a wife fol'." Ol'." against her
husband without his consent

•

Section 78-24-8(1),
not an absolute privilege.

though,

under its own terms,

The statute lists thi:ee spPcit

is
1··

exceptions to the application of the mai:ital pl'."ivi]Pq<', ,. 111' 1

-4-

11 ,

11• ,,

,rf•pl ic·rli• \,.

instant case, and a general

v1here it is otherwise specially provided by

r•r t•>n:

Tlw

. •,,

in thP

p,Jl,,•, of

Rules of Eviclence provide otherwise.

Rule 23 of

Evirlence limits the privile']e only to testimony

roncPrning confidential communications between husband and
,.1[fe
3

r1uring the marria']e.

Appellant's trial counsel agreed to

Jlow Lori Bundy to testify when assured that her testimony

v1n11lrl rleal only with her anrl appellant's work schedules and
not any confidential communications (T. 75-82).
Siqnificantly, although appellant moved for a mistrial based
on his wife's testimony (T. 79), he did not formally object to
her testimony, nor rlid he move to strike any statement made by
her on the grounds that it concerned confidential
commun ica t ions.
Evidence Rule 23 was intended to modify Section
78-24-8 ( 1), accordinq to the Committee Note to Rule 21 in the

1071 erlition of the Rules of Evidence as Adopted by the
:01JTJremP rourt of JJtah (see Appendix A).
rontrols,

Thus, since Rule 23

Lori's testifying was proper.
Furthermore, Rule;:> provines:

"Except to the extent

to which they may he relaxed by other procedural rule or
statute applicable to the speci fie situation, these rules
shall apply in every proceeding, both criminal and civil,
·•rr<l11ctiod hy or under the supervision of a court, in which
r•1d0nce is produced"
'll-24-R ( 1)

(Emphasis added).

Since section

is more str inCJent than Rule 7.3, Rule 23 is

controlling.

-5-

In addition, Rule 101, recently cidoptP.J

h•r

t!, 1

Court, states that the Rules of Evidence are to qove 1 n
proceedings in Utah courts, with certain excertion uw1<'r
1101 not applicable here.
states:

1 ,,.

The Committee Note to Rule lnl

"Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the Rulr

Evidence applicable in all instances in courts of the
including situations previously governed by statute, excer•t
the extent that specific statutory provisions are expressly
retained."

(Emphasis added. )

Moreover, the same Note

expressly rejects the position of the Court in State v.
Hansen, Utah, 5R8 P.2d 164 (1978) that statutory provisions of
evidence law inconsistent with rules of evidence take
precedence.

Therefore, Rule 23 controls the

of

marital privilege since the provisions of Section 78-24-8(1)
have not been expressly retained, and since Lori !3unnv's
testimony did not concern confidential communications, such
testimony was proper even without appellant's consent.
It is also important to note that the foundation of
the marital privilege outlined in Section 78-24-8 has been
severely undermined.

The section is based on the premise

"there are particular relations in which it is the policy of
the law to encourage confidence and preserve it inviolate."
Id.

The United States Supreme Court in Trammel v. United

States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), dealing with an accused's
privilege against a spouse's testimony, noted that the marital
privilege rule originally was based on the policy of
preserving marital harmony, but reasoned that where one spn,,s·
-6-

ic
1,,

11il

Jing to t<;stify against the other in a criminal

"ceecling, "there is probably little in the way of marital

11,irmony for the privilege to preserve."
1

Id. at 52.

The Court

<Tognizecl that the original legal underpinnings of the

'''"' i r "I

privilege rule -- whereby a woman was regarded as a

hettel ancl hacl no separate legal identity -- had long since
bee" removecl in our modern society, so the re remained no
contemporary justification for the privilege.

Thus, the Court

,:oncluded that a spouse may not be compelled to testify (£!_.
Utah Constitution, Art, I,§ 12;

Utah Code Ann.§; 77-1-6

(1982)), but neither may a spouse be foreclosed from
testifying. In other words, only the witness-spouse has the
privilege; the defendant-spouse has no privilege.
Although Trammel dealt with a federal statute, the
Court's rationale in Trammel is applicable to the instant
case.

Since Lori Flundy willingly testified

against

appellant, her husband, and since appellant had already
initiated divorce proceedings (T. 88, 165-166, 179-181),
allowing Lori's testimony was not contrary to the underlying
policy of Section 78-24-8(1).

Therefore, appellant's claimed

privilege is without foundation.
Also significant is the fact that former Code
Section 77-44-4 (1978), which was nearly identical to Section

78-24-8(1) except for its express application to criminal
proceedings, was repealed by 1980 Utah Laws, ch. 15,

1,

the legislature's intent to remove the privilege in
iriminal trials.

This Court has held that its primary
-7-

responsibility is to give effect to the leqislnrtir<>'s
underlying intent.

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., lltilh, r, 1v 1

P.2d 934 (1980).
This Court in State v. Brown, 14 Utah 7d 324,
P. 2d 930 ( lq63), held that it was error for the prosecutor
comment on the failure of the defendant's wife to take the
stand.

In the instant case, however, appellant's wife

voluntarily took the stand, and there was no statement, nor
could there have been any statement, by the prosecutor which
infringed on the witness-spouse's right to refuse to testify.
Therefore, since the voluntary testimony of
appellant's wife did not concern confidential communications
between her and appellant,

it was in compliance with Cviilence

Rule 23, and the trial court did not err in permitting such
testimony.
B.
EVEN IF APPELLANT'S PRIVILEGE WAS
ABSOLUTE, HE CONSENTED THROUGH COUNSEL TO
HIS WIFE'S TESTIMONY.
Assuming arguendo that Section 78-24-8(1) controls
the issue of marital privilege, appellant still cannot clail'l
error because he agreed through counsel to his wife's
testifying against him.

Section 78-24-R(l) permits spousal

testimony upon such consent.
Prior to Lori Bundy's taking the stand, appellant's

trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge held an
off-the-record discussion in chambers concerning her abilitv

-8-

tn

testify.

)';,).

llrpel lant was not rresent at this niscussion (T.

l\f'flel lant' s

trial counsel agreen to allow Lori to take

r,lfl,l

ann

i 1

lifter her testimony, appellant moved for a mistrial,

le1n11riq

testify as to her ann appellant's work schenules

that he had not personally consente<1 to his wife's

L'"stifyinq against him (T. 75-76).
It is well settlen that a client is bound by his
attorney's actions, although an attorney may not waive or
surrender a funnamental right of a client without the client's
consent.

State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674, cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 11157 (1981); Matter of Hatfield, 231 !{an.
427, 646 P.2d 481 (1982); State v. Collins, 133 Ariz. 21), 648
P.2d 13'> (1982).

Since under the rationale of Trammel, supra,

appellant has no fundamental right to foreclose his wife from
testifying, appellant is bounrl by his attorney's consent to
Lori's testimony.
C.
ANY ERROR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY
OF APPELLANT'S WIFF. WAS HARMLESS.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence,and no error or
nefect in any ruling or order in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of
the parties, is ground for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial 1ustice.
court at
every stage of the proceeding must
disregarn any error or nefect in the
proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.

-9-

Furthermore, this Court in State v.

Eaton,

P.2•1

\lt,1h,

llJ

4

(1977), set forth the following standard for determinin 1
whether an error is prejudical:
• • • if the error is such as to justify a
belief that it had a substantial adverse
effect upon the defendant's right to a
fair trial, in that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there may
have been a different result, then the
error should not be regarded as harmless.
In the instant case, the testimony of appellant's
wife was merely corroborative.

The information elicited from

her, as to her and appellant's work schedules and the
babysitting arrangements made with the victim, was also
brought out in the testimonies of Douglas Christiansen, the
victim, and appellant.

'J'hus, the alleged error could not have

affected a substantial right of appellant's,

if he ever had a

substantial right in light of the rationale of Trammel, supra,
nor is there a reasonable likelihood that absent Lori Bundy's
testimony there may have been a different result.
any error was harmless.

-10-

Therefore,

POINT II

rm IMPROPF:R OPINION TF:S"'IMONY WAS ADMITTED
INTO EVIDF:NCE AT TRIAL,

APPELLANT CANNOT CHALLENGE OFFICER
S TFSTIMOtN BF:Cl\USE llPPELLMJT RAISED
NO OBJECTION AT TRIAL.
A.

Officer Welby Scott, a detective with the West
valley City Police Department, testified at trial that he had
received information that the victim, Sherry Christiansen, had
been sexually abused by her father, Douglas Christiansen, but

upun investigation Officer Scott determined that the
accusation was "unfounden"

( T. 149-151).

obiect to this testimony at trial.

Appellant nin not

Appellant now claims that

such testimony was improper ann prejudicial.
It is well settled in Utah that a party cannot raise
an issue for the first time on appeal absent exceptional
circumstances.

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702

11971); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983).
Appellant in his brief alleges that there was a
"family conspiracy" against him and that, therefore, the Court
should review the evidence more closely (Appellant's Brief
p. 9).

/\sine from this bald assert ion appellant provides no

evidence of such conspiracy.

Thus, appellant has failed to

establish that there are exceptional circumstances which would
warrant review of the challenged testimony by the Court.

-11-

B.

OFFICER SCOTT'S TESTIMOIN

rrnrrr.

Assuming arguendo that this issue is prof"'tl'!

1 ,,

1

the Court, Officer Scott's testiniony was well within 11,.
contemplated by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Eviclence, cited 1, 1
appellant.
Officer Scott was not testifying as an expert, so
opinion or inferences in his testimony are limitecl by
subsection

(1)

of Rule 56 to those which "the judge fincls

(al

may be rationally based on the perception of the witness Ann
(b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or
to the determination of the fact in issue."
Significantly, subsection (3) of the same rule
states:

"Unless the juclge exclucles the testimony he shall

deemed to have made the finding requisite to its admission."
Since the trial court clicl not exclude the testimony, the trial
judge must have determined that the testimony passed the test
of subsection

(1).

In any event, Officer Scott's testimony that the
allegation against the victim's father was unfounded was both
rationally based on his perception of his investigation of the
allegation and helpful to a clear unclerstancling of his
testimony or to the determination of the substance of the
allegation.

Thus, Officer Scott's testimony complied with ,he

requirements of Rule 56(1) and did not constitute improper
opinion testimony.

-12-

POINT III
l\PPF.LLAtlT Hl\S WAIVE:[) HIS OBJECTION TO ANY
l\LLP<:Pn m:n:C'r IN '!'HP, INFORMATION BY
f'l\ILING TO OBJP,CT THERETO BEFORE TRIAL.

Appellant in his Supplemental Brief claims that the
is fatally defective because it fails to state a
specific date on which the offenses were committed.

Appellant

has not previously raised such objection.
Rule 12(b)(l), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
requires that any objection to the information be raised at
least S days prior to trial, unless the objection is that the
information fails to show jurisdiction in the court of to
charge an offense.

Subsection (d) of the same rule provides

that failure to so object constitutes a waiver.

See State v.

Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 201 (lq83).
\·/here, as in the instant case, the defendant does
not object to the information before or at trial, this waiver
rule is analogous to the rule that a party cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal.

Wagner v. Olsen, supra;

State v. Steggell, supra.
Appellant does not challenge the jurisdiction of the
trial court; appellant claims only that the information, by
failing to allege a specific date,2 did not state with
sufficient particularity the actual transaction on which the

The victim could recall only the general period of time,
nrit the specific dates (T. 41, 63-65).

-13-

charges are basecl.

Appellant contends thilt this al 1"'1"'1

defect prejudicially impaired his ahility to prepare a
defense.
Appellant's own authorities refute this contc·llLl%
Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Proceclure, citecl hv
appellant, states:

"Such things as time, place, means,

intent, manner, value ancl ownership need not he alleged unJesc
necessary to charge the offense."

(Emphasis added.)

same subsection requires only that the

That

information "charge

offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using
the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense
sufficient to give the clefendant notice of the charge."
The information in the case at bar used the
statutory names of the two offenses chargecl:
forcible sodomy.

Thus,

rape ancl

the information complied with the

above statutory requirement and furthermore fulfilled the
primary purpose of an information, which is, as stated by this
Court in State ex. rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 646 P.2d 727
(1982), "to put the clefendant on notice of the charges leveleo
against him.

"Id. at 731.

Appellant attempts to establish that the "time"
element was necessary to charge the offense ancl so shoulrl
been alleged because, appellant claims,

failure to alle'le the

specific date prevented him from using the alibi defense.
Appellant cites State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d

-14-

7

h4

il'J'l'l),

in support of the proposition that the issue of time

milY lie v<ery important where defendant's defense
, ,

1

!'our t

noterl

is alibi.

in Cooper, however, that the defendant had

,,J.,,inced the defense of alibi and so granted the defendant
",, r "lief on that basis.
In the instant case, appellant also did not raise
the defense of alibi.

Thus, he should likewise be granted no

relief because of the information's failure to allege the
precise time of the offense.
Moreover, this Court has stated:

"It is therefore

well established in this jurisdiction that where time is not
of the essence of the crime the exact time is immaterial
State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113, 116
(lg27).

Time is not the essence of rape or forcible sodomy,

so the exact time is immaterial.
Therefore, the information's failure to allege a
sr>:'ci f ic date on which the offenses were committed does not
render it defective.

The information adequately charged an

offense, putting appellant on notice of the charges leveled
against him.

Thus, appellant's failure to object to this

alleged defect at least S days before trial constitutes a
waiver.
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POINT IV
THE VICTIM'S CONSENT OR LACK Tl!ERFOF IS
NOT AT ISSUE SINCE SHE WAS UNDER 14 YEARS
OF AGE.
Appellant in his Supplemental Brief argues that,
despite statutory prov is ions to the contrary,

the prosc·cut 1

is required to establish that the victim of rape and forcible
sodomy did not consent to the sexual acts even where the
victim is under 14 years of age.

Based on this argument,

appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to
discharge him at the end of the State's case-in-chief on the
grounds that the State had not proved lack of consent.
However, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-406(7) (1978) provides

that certain sexual acts, including sexual intercourse anct
sodomy, are without consent of the victim where the victim is
under 14 years of age, as was the victim in the instant case.
Thus, consent was not at issue in the instant case.

Appellant

does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence as to the
other elements of the crimes charged.

CONCLUSION
The testimony of appellant' s wife was within the
scope contemplated by Rule 23, Utah Rules of Evidence, which
modifies the marital privilege claimed by appellant uncter Utah
Code Ann.§ 78-24-8(1).

Even if Rule 23 did not modify the

statute, appellant consented through counsel to his wife's

-16-
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In any event, any error in permitting
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i11H1ny was harmless since it did not affect a

ial

', 1,,,,,,1
1

l•·r

''"'"'

rioht of aprellant nor was there a reasonable
rhat ahsent the testimony of appellant's wife there
been a different result in light of the fact that

\Pstimony was merely corroborative and added nothing

uni•.JllP to the State's case.
Appellant cannot challenge Officer Scott's testimony
or the

information since he did not timely object to the

alleged errors or defects connected therewith.
appellant's objections are without merit.

Even so,

Finally, consent

was not at issue at trial because the victim was under 14
years of age.
Therefore, the convictions below should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of January

19 84.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing brief to Edwin F. Guyon, attorney for
rlefPndant, 820 Newhouse Building, Ten Exchange Place, Salt
City, Utah R4114,

day of January, 1984.
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APPENDIX A

This Appendix contains a photo copy of Rule 23 and
"'·- •1npa11ying Note as they appear in Carvel Harward's copy of
the 1971 edition of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Mr. Harward

is the Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney who prosecuted this
below.

The handwritten annotations and underlining are

Mr. Harward's.
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or integrity or their vpposites, shall be inadmissible; (d)
evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only
as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be
inadmissible.
NOTE: Clause (a) appears consistent with our present procedure as
does clause (b). Clause (c) contains the same limitation on character
testimony for impeachment purposes as appears in Rule 21 in respect
to a convicbon of a crime. Clause (d) prohibits proof of specific
instances of conduct to prove character trait for impeachment purposes. (See Rule 46, however, on manner of proof of character
where the same is an issue in the case.)

I
Rule 23.

Privilege of Accused

( 1) Every person has in any criminal action in
which he is an accused a privilege not to be called as a
witness and not to testify.

c. ..
S

..,..

(Z) An accused in a criminal action has a privilege
to prevent his spouse from testifying in such action with
to any confidential rommunication had or made
them while they were husband and wife, excepting only (a) in an action in which the accused is charged
with (i) a crime involving the marriage relation, or (ii) a
crime against the person or property of the other spouse
or the child of either spouse, or (iii) a desertion of the
other spouse or a child of either spouse, or (b) as to the
communication, in an action in which the accused offers
evidence of a communication between himself and his
spouse; but a wife is not compelled tq testify against
Jmsband, nor a husband against his wife .

14

(3) An accused in a criminal action has nn p1 , ,
to refuse, when ordered by the iu<lge, to suLm1! Iii, i,,
tn ex a min a uon or to do any act 111 the prcscme "CT J1,
j'i:tdge Or the tner 1 the fact exec t to refuse to te,(J;
xcept
at he shall not be re uire to ive evide 11 ;,
provided by Section 12 Ari I 1,
1

,,

NOTE: Subdivision (t) of this rule conforms to tbe constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. Subdivision (2) modifies
78-24-8 ( t) prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other
and limits tbe privilege to confidential communications, Subdivisioo
(3) deals s?lely wit!1 privilege. It does not purport _to change or
affect '.'onsbtubonal _immumbes, It 1s supported by history, logie<J
analysis, and the weight of authonty. (See 8 W1gmore on Evidence
(3rd Ed.) Sec. 2265.)

Rule 24.

Definition of Incrimination

A matter will incriminate a person within the mean·
ing of these Rules if it constitutes, or forms an essential
part of, or taken in connection with other matters dis·
closed, is a basis for a reasonable inference of such a vioJa,
tion of the laws of this State or of the United States as
to subject him to liability to punishment therefor, unless
he has become for any reason permanently immune from
punshment for such violation.

Rule 25.

Self-Incrimination: Exceptions

Subject to Rules 23 and 37, every natural per!on has
a privilege, which he may claim., to refuse to disclose in '
15

